Hegel and the Infinite by Slavoj Zizek

Author:Slavoj Zizek
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Religion/Christian Theology/Liberation
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Published: 2011-09-11T16:00:00+00:00

BETWEEN FINITUDE AND INFINITY: EASY-TOO-EASY DIALECTIC

A first approach to the space between finite and infinite might be described as the easy-too-easy dialectic against dualism. In this approach, we univocalize the finite and the infinite as two terms set over against each other. A certain operation of negation is at work here. The infinite is not what the finite is; the finite is not what the infinite is. The finite is defined in more or less determinate terms. The infinite, as what the finite is not, is not so determinable. The infinite is the indeterminate and indeed has nothing but a privative character. We find a more privative definition of the infinite in ancient thought, for instance, in Aristotle (Physics 3.4–8). While this is not Hegel’s infinite, there is something of crucial relevance, namely, Hegel’s own attitude to the indeterminate. This is quite negative: without some determination there is for him no articulated intelligibility. For him, we might grant the indeterminate as a beginning but must move beyond it, not only in the direction of determination, but also self-determination. I will come to this later.

Here the stress on the determinate, wedded to the operation of negation, sets the finite and infinite over against each other, and the purported univocalization of each produces a dualism between them. By way of response, the easy-too-easy dialectic is found in many standard descriptions of Hegel’s thought. Starting with dualism, we find we cannot stay with dualism. If we think the finite, we also have to think what the finite is not. The fixed determination of finitude over against the infinite cannot be the last word. To think the first is necessarily to think the second and to pass over from finitude to the infinite. This easy dialectic works the other way also. If we think of infinitude over against the finite as determinable, we think a mere indetermination, and to think an indetermination is not to think. To think the infinite then must entail more than indeterminacy, and we find ourselves in a passage beyond indeterminacy to the finite. The coimplication of finite and infinite seems to result, and we begin on one side or the other.

Hegel is committed to some such view but, of course, the delicate question is the nature of this coimplication. I speak of an easy-too-easy dialectic since it seems to work all but analytically as simply trying to think what either finitude or infinity means. We find in thinking one, we cannot but think about the other, and this works both ways from finite to infinite, from infinite to finite. It all seems so easy. Why then do we not bow before the wisdom of this logic in a more docile way?

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